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Haden: Negligence--Fumes
from
Spontaneously
Ignited Refuse from Coal Min
WEST VIRGINIA
LAW
QUARTERLY
NEGLIGENCE - FumiiEs FRom SPONTANEOUSLY IGNITED REFUSE
FROm COAL MnE - LIABILITY TO ADJACENT LANDOWNERS. Adjacent landowners brought an action on the case against a coal
company for the damages resulting to their property from the
noxious smoke, fumes and dust emitted from the burning of a

gob pile on the coal company's premises.
The mine inspector
had found the operator leaving machine cuttings (bug dust) in
the mine and ordered the same removed, because of its high inflammability. The defendant deposited it on the gob pile and
the pile later spontaneously ignited causing the damages. Held:
That the depositing of the bug dust with the other refuse was
actionable negligence. Rinehart v. Stanley Goal Go.
Numerous cases have arisen in the several jurisdictions where
damage has resulted to adjoining property owners by the operation of industrial plants, but in most of them it was sought to
obtain equitable relief against nuisances.! Actions at law have
been surprisingly few. Slight inconveniences, consistent with,
and instant to community usage, do not make out a legal nuisance.'
Assuming a nuisance to exist a court of equity may be faced with
the alternative of stopping a useful industry or granting substantial relief in the form of damages.' By allowing damages in
an action at law, on the theory of negligence, this later result is in
effect obtained, except that damages will be awarded only as of
the time of bringing the action, since only in exceptional cases
will a law court award permanent damages!
This case is the first in which the West Virginia court has
imposed liability for the burning of gob piles, although it has
previously laid down the general proposition, that a man can use
his property to conduct any lawful business, but if his negligent
operation of the same causes injury he will be liable in dam1163 S. E. 466 (W. Va. 1932).
- Face v. Cherry, 117 Va. 41, 84 S. E. 1v (1915); Stoneburner v. O-Gas-Co
Sales Corp., 135 Misc. 216, 237 N. Y. Supp. 339 (1929); Georgia v. Tenn.
Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, 27 S. Ct. 618 (1906), 237 U. S. 474, 35 S. Ct.
631 (1915) ; Holman v. Mineral Point Zinc Co., 135 Wis. 132, 115 N. W. 327
(1908); City of Selma v. Jones, 202 Ala. 82, 79 So. 476 (1908); Knocker
v. Camden Coal Co., 82 N. J. Eq. 373, 88 Atl. 955 (1913).
aChicago - Virden Coal Co. v. Wilson, 67 Ill. App. 444 (1896); United
Verde Extension Alining Co. v. Ralston, 296 Pac. 262 (Ariz. 1931); Czarneski
v. Bolen-Darnell Coal Co., 91 Ark. 58, 120 S. W. 376 (1909).
'Ebur v. Alloy Metal Wire Co., 304 Pa. 177, 155 AtI. 280 (1931); Alexander v. Wilkes-Barre Anthracite Coal Co., 254 Pa. 1, 98 Atl. 794 (1916).
'Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Works, 113 Tenn. 331, 83
S. W. 658 (1904).
'Bartlett v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 92 W. Va. 445, 115 S. E. 451 (1922).
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ages It appears from the language of the opinion that the court
clearly means to confine the rule of this case to the situation
where the defendant has been negligent, for they say, "without
deciding whether the defendant would be liable if it had exercised due care in disposing of the mine refuse we are of the opinion that it did not do so." By this does the court mean to say
that it is negligence to have a gob pile at all? As appears in the
record and briefs, coal mines usually dispose of their refuse by
making a gob pile, and all gob piles contain a certain amount of
unmarketable coal,8 along with the slate, bone coal and other impurities
It is submitted that the court in effect took judicial
notice of the fact that an ordinary gob pile is not highly inflammable because the facts show "that the dump had existed since
1922 (5 years or longer, but it did not become ignited until a few
months after the defendant began depositing the bug dust." It
is further submitted that it is the unusual rather than the usual
situation for operators to leave the machine cuttings (bug dust)
in the mine, as in this case, since the statute prohibits the same."
The ruling of the court, therefore, should be confined to the facts,
namely, where the machine cuttings were allowed to accumulate
in the mine and then were dumped all at one time on the gob
pile. If this suggestion is valid the decision is not so likely to
place a heavy burden on the coal industry since separate disposition of the machine cuttings that had been allowed so to accumulate could be made without great expense. But if the coal
operators must separate all of the bug dust, machine cuttings
and other unmarketable coal from the refuse and make separate
disposition of them, the cost would be so prohibitive that the coal
industry of the state would be badly penalized.
-CARzs H. HADEN.
7
Snyder v. Philadelphia Co., 54 W. Va. 149, 46 S. E. 366 (1903); Me.Gregor v. Camden, 47 W. Va. 193, 34 S. E. 936 (1899); Powell v. Bentley
& Gerwig Furniture Co., 34 W. Va. 804, 12 S. E. 1085 (1891); Chambers v.
Cramer,
49 W. Va. 395, 38 S. E. 691, 54 L. R. A. 545 (1901).
8
Delinition of "gob" is "any pile of loose waste in the mine, of coal
and other minerals that are not marketable."
Glossary of Mining and Mineral Industry Dept. of Interior (Dept. of Mines).
"Record
of Rinehart v. Stanley Coal Co., supra n. 1, p. 166.
1
0W. V. Rsv. CoDE (1931) c. 22, art. 2, § 11: "In all mines, accumulations of line, dry coal dust shall, as far as practicable, be removed from the
mine, and all dry and dusty operating sections kept thoroughly watered down
or rock dusted or dust allayed by such other methods as may be approved
by the state department of mines."
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